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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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25 September 1962

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: President Ayub
Ambassador Aziz Ahmed of Pakistan
Foreign Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra
Air Marshal Asghar Khan
(Pakistan Embassy rapporteur)

Secretary McNamara
Ambassador McConaughy
Assistant Secretary Talbot
Deputy Assistant Secretary Bundy

The meeting opened on a cordial note, with some discussion of the Secretary's coming to Pakistan in the future to climb mountains. Ayub remarked that he had been particularly anxious to see the Secretary as he was confident of direct and explicit answers even though they might not always be in accord with Pakistani views.

1. Ayub then led off and made the following points:

a. There was no desire to alter the scope of U. S. military aid, and he had requested the Pakistani Service comments be prepared in that vein. However, the performance had not fully lived up to the present agreed scope. The Army had deficiencies, and the Air Force had "more critical" ones.

b. Army. He did not seek an enlargement of the agreed force base, although an additional division in East Pakistan was needed and was being maintained, by the GOP itself. However, deliveries were too often in "dribblets", so that the program seemed "self-defeating." Their basic units still had a great deal of British materiel, raising problems of ammunition compatibility, etc., and especially, problems of different types of communications equipment. In the anti-aircraft brigade, the guns were out-dated, and they had a need to switch to anti-aircraft missiles, specifically the Hawk.

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c. Navy. The Pakistani destroyers needed a good anti-aircraft capability in the form of air cover and particularly anti-aircraft missiles. He urged that the destroyer-types supplied be at least compatible with anti-aircraft missiles.

d. Air Force. He alluded at once to the maintenance of a force level of 120 F-86F's, and then referred to gaps that had occurred in the past in spare parts supply. He noted that his Air Force wanted a 30-day inviolate stock, but that this was apparently contrary to our views and practices. He said that if necessary they were prepared to buy the equipment for such a stock. Lastly, he referred to the in-commission rate of the F-104's as only three out of twelve aircraft, and urged that this problem be remedied.

e. General. He recognized that the U. S. was prepared to send its own forces in certain contingencies, but "why not let the Pakistani do what they can" to forestall this eventuality? He said that U. S. intervention would also have serious implications, and went on to the suggestion that the U. S. pre-position additional equipment and stocks in Pakistan, to which the Pakistani could have access in an emergency. Through such means, it might be possible to absolve the U. S. of the responsibility of intervention.

2. Secretary McNamara responded by saying he would go over the present picture and our plans and lay them out frankly for the President.

a. Deliveries. He undertook "flatly" that deliveries during FY 1963 would be "at least twice, perhaps 2 1/2 times" as great as in FY 1962. The delivery performance last year had been poor, for which there were reasons, though not alibis or justifications. He alluded to the Berlin buildup, the crises in South Vietnam and Thailand, and the need to build up CONUS reserves as contributing factors.

b. Specific Items.

(1) Tanks. 130 from previous programs would be delivered in FY 1963, and these would be mostly M-48's, which he pointed out were superior in firepower and armor to the M-47. 72 additional were programmed in this fiscal year for later delivery. Ayub seemed pleased but made no specific comment.

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(2) Vehicles. We would deliver 2200 jeeps and approximately 800 trucks and other vehicles in FY 1963, and were funding an additional 1500 in this year's program. Referring specifically to Ayub's concern about new vehicles, he noted that 100% of the jeeps and 90% of the 2 1/2-ton trucks, for example, would be new procurement.

(3) APC's. We would delivery 73 M-113's, sufficient for one battalion, by 30 June 1963. He specifically noted that we were not considering the M-59.

(4) Special Forces. We would equip two additional companies in the Baluch Battalion and provide paratroop equipment for five companies of the Battalion. Ayub interjected to ask about his parachute brigade, which he said had the principal military value of forcing dispersion of opposing forces. The Secretary responded that he recognized a need in this area and that he would have the MAAG and our Army people look into what might be done about it.

(5) Rifles. Before the Secretary could get started, Ayub undertook to tell the story as the Pakistani saw it. He said that they had a going ordnance factory set up after the war to build the .303 rifle, and had \$100 million investment in this facility. The Belgians and the British had been approached some years back and had been prepared to provide blueprints for their versions of the NATO rifle. However, the U.S. had objected strenuously to doing so, in approaches at all levels including an alleged discussion between himself and General Lemnitzer. (The Ambassador said that he personally had also raised the problem on several occasions.) Hence, the Pakistani had concluded that there was no prospect of getting production information from the United States. Meanwhile, they had learned that the Germans had a good NATO rifle, which was rugged and simpler to produce than others. They had found that it did not take much money to re-tool their production facilities in Pakistan, hence, the "decision" taken recently to ask us to suspend M-1 shipments. (He did not assert that a final deal had been made with the Germans, but did make clear that this was their present choice.)

The Secretary responded that he would undertake flatly to supply the M-14 blueprints without charge if this was the Pakistani desire. He then went on to say the M-1 was an excellent rifle and highly esteemed by senior U.S. military authorities, particularly in the Marine Corps. Hence, we had been satisfied that we were doing the right thing in undertaking

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to supply the 60,000 M-1's through MAP. Ayub smilingly asked: "Would you give us 60,000 M-14's?" The Secretary replied: "Absolutely not." The U. S. still did not have its own needs met and simply could not spare them. However, the U. S. was prepared not only to supply M-1's for the immediate needs of the MAP-supported forces, but to supply a "combat reserve" that would be enough for other forces that we had not supported in the past. There was some discussion of the possible total need and Ayub stated that his total forces were 220,000, of whom about 160,000 should be equipped with rifles, although the total need would be about 200,000 with allowance for a reserve of 40,000.

The Secretary responded that we were prepared to underwrite a program of standardizing on M-1 rifles, with sufficient ammunition as well. He then argued that while we were prepared to supply the M-14 production data, it was complex to produce and considerably more expensive.

Ayub concluded this discussion by saying that this was a "generous offer" and he would take it back to his people and give us an answer. In a joking final exchange, the Secretary made clear that the M-1's were not sitting in warehouses, so that our supplying them was not designed as a favor to ourselves.

(6) Reserves of Equipment. Ayub raised this issue, and the Secretary responded that while we recognize the need for a 60-day ammunition reserve, we did not believe we should go ahead on an equipment reserve until the modernization process had been completed.

(7) Communications. The Secretary said we would step up deliveries markedly in this fiscal year, and had approximately 2200 sets of various types scheduled. Ayub asked whether this would make possible total replacement of the British sets, and the Secretary directed Mr. Bundy to look into this.

3. Air Force Items

a. F-86F's. The Secretary said we could find no record of any offer undertaking to keep the level at 120. After careful review, we estimated the continuing need at 102, and were prepared to supply attrition aircraft to maintain this level. This would mean nine more F-86F's in the near future, to be delivered during FY 1963. (He remarked that this was three more than the six that had been indicated to Asghar Khan last week.) In conclusion, the Secretary emphasized

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that we continued to regard the F-86F as an effective aircraft and would maintain it as long as necessary.

b. F-104's. The Secretary said that, apparently, the PAF had been very deficient in its requisitions, although there might also be fault on the U. S. side in meeting their needs. In any case, we would undertake to maintain an in-commission rate of not less than nine out of the twelve, and he himself would make arrangements to receive a monthly report on the situation.

c. 30-day Involate Stocks. Asghar Khan raised this again, noting that they could afford within the Air Force budget to pay for this on a one-shot basis. The Secretary said that we did not initially think the 30-day stock was necessary, and that the Pakistani in any case should not have to spend their money for this kind of purpose. He undertook, in any event, to maintain whatever stocks were necessary to keep the in-commission rate at an acceptable level. (Not specified).

d. F-104 Attrition Aircraft. The Secretary undertook flatly that we would supply these.

e. Transport Aircraft. The Secretary said that we recognized their need in this area and our commitment. We were not yet certain what was required, but were sending a survey team in November to find out. He noted that while a ton-mile analysis might indicate that four C-130's would do the whole job, he recognized the need to balance this aspect against the need for flexibility. Ayub remarked that adequate size for maintenance was a consideration, and that a squadron of twelve was the usual figure. The Secretary did not respond to this implied suggestion.

f. Helicopters. The Secretary said we were programming 18 H-13's and six H-43B's. There was some discussion of the carrying capacity of the H-13 which was stated to be eight. (This impression was, of course, in error and should be corrected in due course.)

g. Ground Support. The Secretary said we would send a group to study the need, but the equipment was very expensive, and that we would have to find a balance. He was inclined to agree that present stocks were probably not sufficient.

4. Navy Items.

a. Submarine. The Secretary said we would definitely fund a submarine in FY 1963 but could not deliver before FY 1964.

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b. Destroyers. The Secretary stated emphatically that the FLETCHER class was an effective destroyer, which the U. S. planned to maintain in its own forces for many years to come. The GEARING class was more readily convertible to take certain sophisticated ASW gear required in the Atlantic, and therefore simply was not available. Ayub asked about the anti-aircraft capability of the FLETCHER class, and the Secretary said he could not answer specifically but would look into it. In closing, Ayub remarked jokingly that his Navy were pretty reasonable people.

5. The Secretary then said that this covered the matters that we had considered important, and Ayub agreed that this was a satisfactory summary. He specifically did not bring up the Hawk question again, nor did he refer at any point in the conversation to replacement aircraft for the F-86 or to CENTO requirements and similar arguments advanced in the PAF brief. Mr. Bundy noted that most of our continuing problems could be handled if the Pakistani would turn directly to General Ruhlen, and Ayub responded that he had real confidence in General Ruhlen and would do so. The Secretary said it would be desirable to make the positions he had taken perfectly clear through an Aide Memoire, and Ayub said he would welcome this. No time limit was stated, nor did Ayub seem in any overpowering hurry.

6. Turning away from military assistance, the Secretary gave a brief report on improvements in U. S. capabilities in referring to the trebling of ^{airlift} aircraft capacity and showing Ayub the five-year projection of alert-status strategic nuclear delivery systems. Ayub gave a final brief homily, paralleling the present U. S. position with that of the British Empire, which had relied on the Navy but on local forces for the defense of the far-flung areas. He thought that the U. S. should do the same, with our strategic capability fulfilling the role that had been occupied by the British Navy. The meeting concluded -- and indeed was conducted throughout -- on a highly cordial note. It seemed apparent that Ayub was, on balance, highly pleased with what he had been told.

William P. Bundy

William P. Bundy
Deputy

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